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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

WALTER PRESTON BOGGESS, JR.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16894

LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The respondent, Walter P. Boggess, Jr., responds to the
state's appeal from the trial court's order granting a writ of
habeas corpus.

The writ of habeas corpus was based on trial

counsel's failure to file a timely appeal.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District, the Honorable David K. Winder
presiding, ordered

that if this Court did not take jurisdiction

of respondent's out-of-time appeal by January 6, 1980, he was to
be released and his conviction of manslaughter set aside on that
date.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order affirming the trial court's
order which granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
- 1 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

he argues that this Court should decline to invoke jurisdictior 1
to hear an out-of-time appeal as previously ruled.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent, Walter Boggess, was tried on May 18, 1978
for second degree murder in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-2
(1953 as amended), before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock of th
Fourth Judicial District.

Respondent was represented at trial .

by court appointed counsel, George Mangan.

Counsel for respon-

dent pursued the lesser included offense of manslaughter as
theory at trial.
May 19, 1978.

Respondent was convicted of manslaughter on

Respondent was desirous of an appeal of his case

-and he made verbal and written demands on his appointed counsel
to perfect an appeal on his behalf.

Mangan did not file a

timely Notice of Appeal.
On November 30, 1978, the Honorable Ernest Baldwin, one
of the Judges of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, received evidence at an evidentiary
hearing on respondent's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus that
proved the following facts:

that respondent did contact Mangan

before time for filing Notice of Appeal had run and demanded an
appeal on his behalf be filed; that respondent did mail a lette
to Mangan on or about July 10, 1978, demanding that an appeal o
his behalf be filed; that Mangan did receive the foregoing
letter on or about July 18, 1978, within time to file timely
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Notice of Appeal for respondent; that Mangan did understand and
know that respondent wanted an appeal; that Mangan at the time
of receipt of the letter from respondent on July 18, 1978, knew
timely appeal could still be perfected; and that Mangan failed
to file a timely Notice of Appeal on behalf of respondent.
Following the evidentiary hearing in which testimony,
evidence and argument was heard, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin,
Jr., ruled that the respondent had been denied his right to an
appeal and his right to counsel under the Fourteenth and Sixth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.

The court entered

the following order by stipulation of counsel for petitioner
and the State of Utah:

he granted respondent permission to

file an out-of-time appeal; and in the event the Supreme Court
declined to invoke jurisdiction he directed respondent return
to the ordering court for appropriate relief.
On October 16, 1979, this Court refused to invoke
jurisdiction for an appeal based on Utah Code Annotated §77-39-5
(1953 as amended).

State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979).

Respondent's counsel, though having been demanded to do so,
failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal.

On December 6, 1979, the Honorable David K. Winder
ordered that if the Supreme Court did not take jurisdiction
of the substantive merits of the appeal by respondent within
thirty (30) days, respondent's Petition for a Writ of Habeas
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corpus would be granted.

On January 6, 1980, the Writ of

Habeas Corpus was granted, and respondent was released from
prison and his conviction was set aside.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AUTHORITY AUTHORIZING THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH TO EXERCISE ITS APPELLATE
POWER IS JURISDICTIONAL.
Utah Code Annotated §77-39-5 (1953 as amended) provides
in pertinent part as follows:
All appeals in criminal cases must
be taken within one month after the
entry of judgment appealed from.
The strict adherence to the jurisdictional aspect of tht
appellate power has been discussed and confirmed in numerous
cases.

The strict adherence to the prescribed time requirement

was construed in Sullivan v. District Court of Summit County,
65 Utah 400, 237 P. 516 (1925).

Following the learning from

Sullivan, ibid., the Utah Supreme Court, not unlike other
appellate tribunals operating under similar jurisdictional directives, have jealously preserved the integrity of the jurisdictional requirement to refuse to hear appellate matters not
timely filed even though pressured by other courts to make discretionary exceptions.

The Utah Supreme Court declined the

out-of-time appeal of the respondent in the instant case for
failing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court timely, State v.
Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979).
-

4 -

Prior in time, this court
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refused to succumb to the pressure directed by the U.S. 10th
Circuit Court of Appeals which sought and directed that the
Utah Supreme Court should hear an out-of-time appeal.
Rahowie v. Smith,

F. 2d

( 19

See

).

POINT II
GRANTING APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN THE
INSTANT CASE, AT THIS TIME, FOR ERRORS
ARISING FROM THE INITIAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has previously
considered all the issues of jurisdiction on appeal in the
instant case, State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979).
The Court refused to take jurisdiction of the appeal based on
the Utah Code Annotated §77-39-5 (1953 as amended).
The Court, in the cited case, found that the Notice
of Appeal was not timely filed as prescribed to the foregoing
statute and therefore ruled it was precluded from addressing the
merits of the respondent's

contentions.

Furthermore, the Court in State v. Boggess, ibid.,
went to say that:
• . • A habeas corpus proceeding can
neither be used as a substitute for an
appeal nor can it extend that statutory
time allotted for filing an appeal.
In support of the foregoing proposition the Court cited
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968), Bryant v.
Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967).
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consistent with the foregoing case law, counsel for
appellant generally contends that a Petition for a Writ of
Habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for an appeal.
Nevertheless, in the case at bar, counsel for appellant urges
otherwise.

A position contrary to his often cited case law.
POINT III
THE RELEASE OF THE RESPONDENT AND THE
SETTING ASIDE OF HIS CONVICTION IS THE
PROPER REMEDY.

Respondent's court appointed counsel had an obligation
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 {1967) to perfeet an appeal on behalf of respondent.
Furthermore, as was pointed out in the brief submitted
by counsel for the appellant, in the event the appointed counse
believes the appeal was wholly frivolous, counsel still has the
duty to his client and the Court to preserve and protect the
client's constitutional rights of appeal--a right that is funda
mental and one that must be protected to insure due process
and in equal protection of the law.
At the evidentiary hearing on Respondent's Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court did not find evidence that
court appointed counsel for respondent complied with the requirj
ments of his duty to his client as directed by Anders v.
California, ibid.

Judge Baldwin specifically found respondent':

fundamental right of appeal had been denied.

- 6provided
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The Court, following the majority case law, ordered that
the parties attempt to have the Supreme Court invoke its appellate jurisdiction to grant respondent an out-of-time appeal.
Furthermore, in the event the Supreme Court declined to invoke
jurisdiction, then the respondent could apply to that Court for
further relief.
The prevailing case law provides that in the event the
infirmity cannot be cured, the alternative relief can only
be release from custody and the setting aside of the conviction.

Nearly all of the following originated as State cases

and proceeded into the Federal system by process of exhausting
remedies of appeal on Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus
proceedings.

Kinsey v. Wainwright, 254 Fed. Sub. 30 (1965);

Pate v. Holman, 341 F.2d 764 (1965); Patterson v. Medberry,
290 F.2d 275 (1961).

The latter, a Tenth Circuit case, dealt

with the denial of the State to provide a transcript for the
purposes of appeal.

The denial abrogated the defendant's

right to appeal his conviction, and the Court in considering
the appropriateness of release on balance with the inability
to cure the infirmity in the appeal process, stated:
. . . the problem of releasing one convicted murderer . • . our system or constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which all
allow no individuous discriminations
between persons and different groups
of persons . . .
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The above court further saw the State as having a
statutory remedy and stated:
• retry the defendant, difficult
but not insurmountable.
In Coffman v. Bomar, 220 Fed. Sub 343 (1963), the defen
dant requested that state officials appoint counsel for his app
process.

The defendant believing he was represented by ap-

pointed counsel was denied an appeal because no timely notice
had been filed in his behalf.

The State failed to appoint

defendant counsel and failed to advise defendant of its inaction.

Time for the appeal had run.

The Court found the

only remedy was to release defendant from custody and set
aside the conviction and allow the State to re-prosecute
the defendant.

The theory was to insure due pro.cess by

putting the defendant in the same position he would have
been should an appeal been granted.
POINT IV
THE STATE, IN THE INSTANT CASE, HAS
STATUTORY REMEDY TO RE-PROSECUTE THE
RESPONDENT.
Utah Code Annotated §76-1-405 (1953 as amended) specifically provides in pertinent part as follows:
Subsequent prosecution not barredCircumstances. -A subsequent prosecution
for an offense shall not be barred
under the following circumstances:
. . . (2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt held
invalid in a subsequent proceeding on
writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or
similar collateral attack.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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The legislative branch has limited the time for
invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by
providing for filing of Notice of Appeal within thirty (30)
days.

Likewise, the legislature has provided the State

authorities with a statutory authority to re-prosecute cases
collaterally attacked by Writs of Habeas Corpus.

The Legi-

slature has not granted any discretionary authority to the Court
to modify the thirty (30) day limitation rule.

In light of

the prevailing case law and the theory of separation of powers,
any such change or modification of the jurisdictional rule
should be by legislative mandate.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Third District Court granting
respondent relief pursuant to his Writ of Habeas Corpus,
releasing him from State custody, should be affirmed.

The

limitation on the time for appeal is jurisdictional and counsel for respondent failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal.
The power of the Supreme Court to now hear the merits of the
defendant's contentions of errors at the time of trial, previously considered on direct appeal is now barred by Res
Judicata.

In addition, this Court simultaneously, in the

same ruling, held this respondent could not use a Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus as a substitute for direct appeal.
The respondent was effectively denied his right to
appeal.

The trial court in an evidentiary hearing found that
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counsel for respondent failed to perfect the appeal as is
required under Anders v. California, ibid., denying respondent
fundamental constitutional rights.
The prevailing case law provides for a cure of the
infirmity in the denial of due process on appeal, and in the
event the infirmity cannot be cured, then the respondent must
be released and the conviction set aside.

The State has a

statutory remedy to re-prosecute the respondent.

The contrived

scheme of constructive notice argued by counsel for appellant
is not sanctioned by statutory law or case law.

Such a

scheme could only properly be affected by appropriate legislation directing such a procedure.
Based on the foregoing, the Order granting respondent
a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing his release and the setting
aside of his conviction should be affirmed.
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